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REFORMING FCC REGULATION OF DOMINANT
TELEPHONE CARRIERS: PUTTING SOME TEETH
INTO THE TEST FOR PREDATION
Thomas K. Gump*
After nearly six decades of heavily regulating America's
telephone industry, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) started firmly down the path of deregulation during the
1980s.1  This deregulatory trend in telecommunications
paralleled similar developments in the motor carrier,2 natural
gas,3 and financial services4 industries. Deregulation in the
telephone industry has taken the form of the price cap regu-
latory scheme for the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company (AT&T) and other dominant telephone carriers.5
Price cap regulation marks a dramatic step away from the
older approach to telephone regulation, rate-of-return regula-
tion,6 which limited a telecommunications carrier's profits to
* B.A. 1989, Georgetown University; J.D. 1992, University of Michigan Law
School. I would like to extend warm thanks to Howard E. Shapiro, Nina Rivera,
Irene Lakes, Olivia Veeks-Egoavil, Rebecca Lynn Margulies, and G. James Frick for
the patient and thoughtful research and editorial assistance provided during the
production of this Note.
1. Dean Burch, Common Carrier Communications by Wire and Radio: A Retro-
spective, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 85, 85 (1985).
2. See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
3. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3369 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3333 (1988)) (repealed 1989).
4. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
5. The FCC deems a telephone company to be dominant if it can exercise
market power sufficient to exploit consumers. Thus far, only AT&T and local
exchange carriers (LECs) have been found to be dominant telephone carriers. See
Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 3 F.C.C.R. 3195, 3202-03
(1988) (further notice of proposed rule making) [hereinafter Further Notice]. Further
Notice was summarized in the Federal Register. See Policy and Rules Concerning
Rates for Dominant Carriers, 53 Fed. Reg. 22, 356 (1988) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
001, 61, 65, 69). Although the basic criticism of the price cap scheme contained in
this Note applies to all telephone companies subject to this form of regulation, this
Note will focus on price cap regulation as applied to AT&T.
6. An excellent summary of rate-of-return regulation and its inherent problems
appeared in a recent opinion by Judge Stephen F. Williams of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia:
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a certain percentage return on total investment. 7 Such a com-
pensation structure led to a highly inefficient use of resources
as regulated entities raised their level of investment to
increase their level of profits, often without regard to whether
the new investment was efficient economically or actually
needed.'
In contrast, price cap regulation attempts to use market
mechanisms and economic incentives to achieve regulatory
goals in a less wasteful manner.9 Price cap regulation allows
AT&T to set its own rates for telephone services as long as
those rates fall between floor and ceiling prices established by
Rate-of-return regulation is based directly on cost. Firms so regulated can
charge rates no higher than necessary to obtain ."sufficient. revenue to cover
their costs and achieve a fair return on equity." As one virtue of perfect com-
petition is that it drives prices down to cost, rate-of-return regulation seems on
its face a promising way to regulate natural monopolies, in principle roughly
duplicating the benefits of competition.
By the late,1980s, however, the FCC began to take serious note of some of
the inefficiencies inherent in rate-of-return regulation. First, the resulting cost
incentives are perverse. Because a firm can pass any cost along to ratepayers
(unless it is identified as imprudent), its incentive to innovate is less sharp than
if it were unregulated....
Second, rate-of-return regulation creates incentives for cost shifting that may
defeat the regulatory purpose and have other ill effects. Firms can gain by
shifting costs away from unregulated activities (where consumers would react
to higher prices by reducing their purchases) into the regulated ones (where the
price increase will cause little or no drop in sales because under regulation the
prices are in a range where demand is relatively unresponsive to price changes).
Third, rate-of-return regulation is costly to administer, as it requires the agency
endlessly to calculate and allocate the firm's costs.
National Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (cita-
tions omitted).
7. For example, regulators might allow a regulated company a 12% return on
investment. Thus, a telephone company which had $50 million invested would earn
a guaranteed annual profit of $6 million. Although the rate-of-return regulatory
scheme was conceived as an attempt to lessen government oversight, it has proven
immensely complicated in practice. Sutapa Ghosh, The Future of FCC Dominant
Carrier Rate Regulation: The Price Caps Scheme, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 401, 405-06
(1989).
8. Judge Breyer uses an extreme example to illustrate this phenomena, known
as the Averch-Johnson effect. Breyer writes: "Michigan Electric Company would be
delighted to borrow $10 million at 7 percent to build Egyptian pyramids if the fair
rate of return is 8 percent. If the regulator approves [the expenditure], it will collect
an additional $800,000 from its Michigan customers, pay $700,000 to its bondholders,
and keep the difference." STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 49 (1982).
9. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 2 F.C.C.R. 5208,
5213-14 (1987) (notice of proposed rule making) [hereinafter Notice]. Notice was
published in the Federal Register. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Dominant Carriers, 52 Fed. Reg. 33, 962 (1987) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. 01).
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the FCC."0 These new regulations give AT&T an economic
incentive to increase efficiency because lower costs will raise
profits.1' Thus, AT&T will enjoy great freedom and flexibility
in pricing its services for the first time in decades.
Interestingly, it was precisely this freedom and flexibility to
price its services that allowed AT&T to engage in
anticompetitive practices prior to regulation. In an article
commemorating the fifty-year anniversary of the FCC's exis-
tence, former FCC Chairman Dean Burch recounted some of
the anticompetitive practices from AT&T's history. 2 For
example, during the 1890s, AT&T embarked upon an "aggres-
sive program of intimidation and acquisition" in order to
monopolize its position in the telephone market.'3 AT&T often
refused to sell equipment or to provide interconnection to
independent telephone companies as part of its plan to acquire
its competitors or to drive them out of business. 4 Although
this initial program of monopolization ostensibly was termi-
nated with the Kingsbury Commitment of 1917,15 AT&T
continued to battle the Department of Justice in the courts for
most of the next fifty years.'6
The threat of predatory pricing by AT&T is foremost among
10. Calvin Sims, F. C.C. Plans Freer Pricing At Baby Bells, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1989, at D1.
11. Id. Under price cap regulation, AT&T, like firms in competitive markets, can
earn extra profits by cutting costs.
12. Burch, supra note 1, at 86-87.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. The Kingsbury Commitment was based upon a letter by Mr. M.C. Kingsbury,
then vice-president of an AT&T predecessor company. Kingsbury wrote his letter to the
Attorney General in response to a threatened antitrust suit by the federal government.
In the Kingsbury Commitment, the vice-president stated that his company agreed to
cease acquiring, directly or indirectly, control over any competing company. In addition,
Kingsbury stated that his company agreed to connect its system with other telephone
systems, so long as the companies which were to be connected assisted with the
technical details. FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE
INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 139-40
(1939) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION]. Thus, the Kingsbury Commitment is one of the
earliest examples of the federal government's concern and preoccupation with AT&T's
anticompetitive practices.
16. For a history of AT&T's early battles with the federal government, see id. at
139-46. The most recent battle ended in 1982 with a consent decree entered between
AT&T and the federal government requiring AT&T to divest its local Bell operating
companies. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Notably, the federal government
based its complaint against AT&T partly on allegations of predatory pricing. See Paul
W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning By Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its
Impact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 25 (1983).
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the antitrust dangers. Under a regime of predatory pricing, a
firm reduces prices in the short run "so as to drive competing
firms out of the market or to discourage entry by new firms in
an effort to gain larger profits via higher prices in the long
run."17 This Note examines the ineffective protections against
predatory pricing by AT&T contained in the price cap scheme.
Part I outlines price cap regulation and explains how the FCC
hopes that a test based on the average variable cost standard 18
will detect predatory pricing. Part II argues that the FCC
erred in adopting an average variable cost standard as the test
for telecommunications predation because that standard
ignores the high fixed costs 19 common to all firms in the
industry. Part II demonstrates that AT&T could engage in
predatory pricing despite the protections contained in the
regulatory scheme. Part II then examines the rationale given
by the FCC for adopting a test based on the average variable
cost standard and demonstrates its inadequacy. Finally, Part
III examines two tests for predation that consider fixed costs,
and suggests that replacing the average variable cost standard
with a test based on long-run marginal cost2 ° would provide
more effective protection against predatory activity by AT&T
in the telecommunications industry.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FCC PRICE CAP SCHEME
Price cap regulation by the FCC represents an entirely new
approach to a century-old problem: ensuring that America's
telephone companies serve the public interest. The price cap
17. Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory
Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 219-20 (1979). Alternatively, predatory pricing has
been defined as "pricing at a level calculated to exclude from the market an equally
or more efficient competitor." RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 188 (1976).
18. Variable costs are "costs that vary with changes in output." 3 PHILLIP
AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 712 (1978). They typically include
such items as labor used in production, repair and maintenance costs, and costs of
custodial help. Id.
19. Fixed costs do not vary with changes in output. They typically include such
items as irreducible overhead, some management expenses, and property taxes. Id.
20. Long-run marginal cost is the anticipated average total cost per output unit.
Id. Because total cost includes both fixed and variable costs, a long-run marginal
cost test will consider, by definition, fixed costs. A firm seeking to stay in business
for the indefinite future must recover its long-run marginal costs. POSNER, supra
note 17, at 189.
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orders2 indicate that the FCC expects that the new price cap
scheme will reduce administrative paperwork, substitute
market dynamics for regulatory second guessing of a carrier's
business judgment, and deter anticompetitive behavior.22 The
following subparts demonstrate that the price cap scheme
attempts to make wide use of the invisible hand of the free
market in order to achieve regulatory goals.
A. Price Cap Regulation and the System of Baskets and
Bands
In the past, telephone carriers regulated by the FCC have
been required to file extensive documentation with the Com-
mission outlining their tariffs23 and demonstrating that the
new prices are both just and reasonable.24 These documents
were reviewed in lengthy administrative proceedings.2"
Because of the time and expense involved in changing a tariff,
this procedure proved to be highly burdensome for the regu-
lated entity.2" Essentially, price cap regulation creates a
range of tariffs that a carrier may file which will be presumed
lawful, thus relieving the carrier of the burden of gaining
regulatory approval.2 This procedure is commonly known as
"streamlined review."28
21. The principal FCC price cap orders appear in Policy and Rules Concerning
Rates for Dominant Carriers, 6 F.C.C.R. 665 (1991) (mem. op. and order on recons.)
[hereinafter Reconsideration Order]; Further Notice, supra note 5; Notice, supra note
9. Reconsideration Order was summarized in the Federal Register. See Policy and
Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 56 Fed. Reg. 5952 (1991) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. 061).
22. See Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 665-68.
23. One court has defined a "tariff" as "a public document setting forth the
services of the carrier being offered, the rates and charges with respect to the
services and the governing rules, regulations and practices relating to those services."
IT&T Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 433 F. Supp. 352, 357 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
24. Reconsideration.Order, supra note 21, at 666. Carriers also have been
required to provides 90 days' notice with new filings. Id.
25. Notice, supra note 9, at 5209-10.
26. Id. at 5210-11.
27. Under a presumption of lawfulness, a party seeking suspension of the tariff
must make a substantial showing that such suspension is warranted. Ghosh, supra
note 7, at 414 n.60. Under streamlined review, filed tariffs are presumed lawful and
become effective after only 14 days, rather than 90 days under the normally
applicable procedures. Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 666.
28. See Reconsideration Order, supra note 21. The FCC sometimes uses the term
streamlined treatment." Id. at 665. For a full discussion of streamlined review see
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Under the price cap approach, AT&T's services are grouped
together in accordance with common characteristics. These
groups are known as baskets, or baskets of services.29 In
initially crafting the price cap scheme, the FCC created three
baskets of services for AT&T. Basket One includes residential
and small business services.3" The remaining two baskets
consist of one basket for 800 services3' and another basket for
the remaining business services that AT&T provides.32 Each
basket has an aggregate price cap, which limits the weighted
average of the individual service rates contained within the
basket.33 AT&T may not charge more than the aggregate cap
placed on the basket for the services contained therein.34 A
recent opinion by Judge Stephen F. Williams explained
weighted averages, aggregate prices, and profit caps in the
new scheme as follows:
A price cap enables a firm to raise the price of a product or
service, so long as the firm offsets any increase for one ser-
vice with decreases for others within the comparison group
selected by the regulator. Thus, if the firm in the bench-
mark period provided 100 units of service A for $1 each
and 100 units of service B for $2 each, for a total of $300,
it could thereafter choose any A-B price combination that,
at the benchmark volume of sales, would yield no more
than $300. 31
To benefit from streamlined review, the regulated entity must
charge for each individual service rates that fall within a
supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
29. Ghosh, supra note 7, at 416.
30. The services contained in Basket One include: (1) daytime Message Tele-
phone Service (MTS), (2) evening MTS, (3) weekend and night MTS, (4) international
MTS, (5) Reach Out calling plan, and (6) operator assistance and credit card calling.
Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 666.
31. Under an 800 calling plan, charges and tolls are billed automatically to the
party called, not to the calling party. Services in this basket include: (1) Readyline
800, (2) AT&T 800, (3) Megacom 800, and (4) All Other 800. Id.
32. The third and final basket includes: (1) ProAmerica calling plans, (2) WATs
calling, (3) Megacom, (4) SDN, (5) other switched services, (6) voice-grade private
lines services and below, and (7) private line services larger than voice-grade. Id.
33. Further Notice, supra note 5, at 3352.
34. Id.
35. National Rural Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(footnote omitted). Judge Williams offers a further example: "[The firm] could sell
theA services at $.75 each and the B services at $2.25 each. 100 x $.75 = $75; 100 x
$2.25 = $225; $75 + $225 = $300." Id. at 181-82.
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range referred to as a "band."3" A band is "the range within
which a carrier may raise or lower any individual rate element
in any year and still be entitled to streamlined review."37 As
long as the carrier does not raise or lower rates beyond the
limits of the bands, the carrier's tariff will be presumed
lawful. 31 In this way, AT&T will be able to avoid the exhaus-
tive procedures normally accompanying a new tariff filing.
B. Price Cap Regulation and Anticompetitive Behavior
The fact that the price cap scheme allows AT&T greater
flexibility to price individual services within a given basket
without the antitrust protection of comprehensive tariff review
suggests that it will be easier for that company to engage in
anticompetitive conduct.39 Specifically, the carrier may choose
to engage in predatory pricing by cross-subsidizing its services.
Under a scheme of cross-subsidization, AT&T would attempt
to charge higher rates to captive customers whose only option
is to purchase telecommunications service from AT&T, while
simultaneously dropping its prices in competitive markets in
order to destroy its rivals. In fact, the company in the past
has lowered "monthly charges to residential users-a
politically popular thing to do-while subsidizing the resulting
revenue shortfalls with excessive long distance fees."4"
Similarly, AT&T could engage in cross-subsidization of other
services, not to gain political benefits, but to monopolize the
telecommunications market and to increase the company's
profits in the long run. Under the price cap scheme, the FCC
believes it has crafted a scheme that will deter AT&T from
engaging in such predatory pricing.
1. FCC Expectations for the Baskets and Bands-The FCC
hopes that the basket and band systems will work together to
check predatory pricing.41 By dividing services that have
competitive and noncompetitive markets into different bas-
kets, the FCC hopes to limit strictly AT&T's ability to
36. Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 666.
37. Further Notice, supra note 5, at 3355.
38. Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 666.
39. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
40. THOMAs K. McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 257 (1984).
41. Ghosh, supra note 7, at 417.
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cross-subsidize rates.42 Within a given basket, the onerous
requirements placed on above-band filings are thought to
make it difficult for AT&T to raise its rates for one service so
that it may predate in another.43 Thus, the cap on aggregate
profits should help to decrease the desirability of predatory
pricing because profits foregone cannot be recouped by raising
rates for other services.44
The FCC also believes that the band system alone dis-
courages predatory pricing.45 Under the band system, AT&T
will be entitled to streamlined review for all new tariffs that
do not increase or decrease prices more than five percent
annually.46 Price changes greater than five percent will be
subject to more exhaustive regulatory review. Thus, if AT&T
desired to predatorily price a service, it either would have to
move prices incrementally downwards over several successive
years at a rate of less than five percent annually or justify a
single price decrease of more than five percent. The FCC
believes that the stringent review accompanying such larger
price changes provides an incentive for AT&T to maintain
stable price levels, thereby deterring predatory pricing.47
2. Average Variable Cost as the Front Line Defense
Against Predation-The quality of the more stringent review
depends on the effectiveness of the standard chosen as the
front-line defense against predation. The FCC believes that
judging below-band rates against an average variable cost
standard will protect effectively against anticompetitive
42. Id.
43. Above-band filings require the fullest possible consideration by interested
parties and by the FCC. Such rates must be filed on 90 days' notice, with a likeli-
hood of suspension. In addition, the justness and reasonableness of above-band rates
must be assessed in light of the overall price cap scheme and the "substantial cause"
test. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 F.C.C.R. 2873,
3100-03 (1989) (second further notice of rulemaking) [hereinafter Second Further
Notice]; see also, Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 666. Second Further
Notice was summarized in the Federal Register. See Policy and Rules Concerning
Rates for Dominant Carriers, 54 Fed. Reg. 19, 836 (1989) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
001, 61, 65). Thus, above-band filings for proposed increases involve detailed and
specific cost justifications which will prove both burdensome and difficult to meet.
Second Further Notice, supra, at 3100-03.
44. Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 666-67; Second Further Notice,
supra note 43, at 3103. Interestingly, by establishing a ceiling on rates, the FCC
expects to create a competitive floor as well. Id. at 3114.
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behavior.48 Under this standard, below-band filings must be
accompanied by a showing that the new rates cover the costs
of providing the service, otherwise known as average variable
costs. 49 For purposes of an initial tariff review, only filed
tariffs lower than the average variable cost of providing the
service will be suspended. 0
The most recent price cap order specifically rejects the
adoption of a long-run marginal cost test as the test for pre-
dation.51 Instead, the FCC adopted the average variable cost
test, despite comments made by those companies that have the
most to fear from future predatory activity by AT&T-its
competitors.52 These companies, including MCI Communica-
tions (MCI) and Sprint Corporation (Sprint), argued that
average variable cost is not the most effective standard to
guard against predation. 53 They urged that a long-run mar-
ginal cost test would provide more effective protection against
predation54 because it would consider, by definition, fixed
cost.55 By rejecting these arguments, the Commission specifi-
cally refused to view the adoption of an average variable cost
48. Id. at 668.
49. The full text of the regulation reads as follows:
Each price cap filing that proposes service category rates below applicable band
limits established in § 61.47(e) of this part, must be accompanied by supporting
materials establishing that the rates cover the service category's average vari-
able cost, or equivalently, that the service category's net additional revenue
resulting from the price change exceeds additional costs.
47 C.F.R. § 61.49(d) (1992).
50. Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 667-68.
51. The FCC order states that long-run incremental cost or other standards
proposed by the parties filing briefs in the proceeding are not as widely used as
average variable cost in testing for predation. Id. at 682 n.39. The order cites the
following cases that examined the average variable cost test: Southern Pac. Com-
munication Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980, 1003-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing various
tests of predation based on average variable cost); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell
Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 235-36 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that prices above incremental and
average total cost are lawful); Superturf Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 66Q F.2d 1275, 1281
(8th Cir. 1981) (holding that prices below fully allocated cost but above average
variable cost are not per se predatory absent predatory intent or other unreasonable
conduct); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.
1977) (finding that prices above average variable cost but below average total cost are
not predatory where subjective intent and long run variables do not establish preda-
tion).
52. Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 668.
53. Id. at 682 n.33.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 20.
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standard as a "loophole" that would allow AT&T to predate
under price cap regulation.56
II. THE AVERAGE VARIABLE COST LOOPHOLE
Throughout the price cap orders, the FCC demonstrates its
concern about crafting a price cap scheme that prevents
predatory pricing by AT&T.57 Thus, despite the existence of
a body of economics literature which regards the phenomena
of predatory pricing as either entirely mythical or no cause for
concern, 58 one must conclude that the FCC regards predatory
pricing by AT&T as a real threat. Otherwise, there would be
no reason for imposing on AT&T the administrative burden of
complying with regulations designed to guard against
predatory tactics. Nonetheless, in adopting an average
variable cost test, the FCC has established a regulatory
scheme that provides mere phantom protection against
anticompetitive behavior which the Commission repeatedly
has asserted is a real threat.
A. Services Priced by AT&T Above Average Variable Cost
Still May Have Predatory Effects
FCC regulations allow below-band filings if supporting
materials establish that the rates cover the service category's
average variable costs. 9 Given the unique nature of the
telecommunications industry, however, such pricing still may
be predatory with regard to presently existing and potential
competition.
1. Prices Above Average Variable Cost May Destroy Pres-
ent Competition-In contrast to more typical industries, the
telecommunications industry is extremely capital intensive.
56. Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 668.
57. See, e.g., Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 668; Second Further
Notice, supra note 43, at 3114.
58. See, e.g., D.T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST 73-74, 243 (1972);
Roland H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, ANTITRUST
L. & ECON. REV., Summer 1971, at 105.
59. 47 C.F.R. § 61.49(d) (1992).
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Before a company can transmit its first call, a vast telephone
network must be in place. Thus, fixed costs constitute a major
part of the cost of providing telecommunications service. An
examination of the financial statements of two of AT&T's
biggest competitors in the long distance market, MCI and
Sprint, supports this conclusion. For example, MCI, which
controlled about sixteen percent of the long distance market in
1991,60 listed the total value of its communications network in
service for that year at nearly nine billion dollars.6' Sprint, a
recent entrant in the long distance market, owned over
thirteen billion dollars worth of property, plant and equipment
in 1991.62 For these companies to survive and earn profits in
the long run, they must recover the fixed network costs as part
of the charges assessed to consumers for telephone service.
Yet under the current price cap scheme, AT&T may price
services that compete with MCI and Sprint at a level that
merely covers or marginally exceeds average variable cost.63
In a competitive market, such a low price would limit the
parties' ability to recover their fixed costs. 4 As the prominent
industrial economist Alfred Kahn has argued, regulated
entities should not be allowed to price at a level that covers
only short-run costs because such low rates are unremunera-
tive if continued over time, and might constitute predatory
behavior.65 Given the tremendous advantages AT&T enjoys
over its competitors in market share, cash flows, and
resources, it could defer recouping its fixed costs much longer
than its smaller competitors.66 Thus, predatory tactics by
AT&T could drive its competitors out of business, allowing
60. MCI COMMUNICATIONS CORP., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1992).
61. Id. at 31.
62. SPRINT CORP., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (1992).
63. See Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, at 668.
64. By definition, a measure of average variable costs does not consider fixed
costs. See supra notes 18-19. Thus, if AT&T priced a service at average variable
cost, it would not recover any of the fixed costs associated with providing the service.
Competitors of AT&T would have to price at similarly low levels in order to not lose
market share. In doing so, they never would recover their fixed costs and therefore
could not operate at a profit in the long run.
65. 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 85 (1970). Kahn has been
described as a "Prophet of Regulation." For an in-depth treatment of Alfred Kahn's
life and economic thinking, see McCRAw, supra note 40, at 222-99.
66. In 1991, AT&T enjoyed a 65% share of the long distance market, $63 billion
in annual revenue, and $16 billion 'in net worth. VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY,
Oct. 16, 1992, at 751, 763. These figures are especially large when compared with
MCI, AT&T's largest competitor, which had only a 16% market share, $8.4 billion in
annual revenue, and $2.9 billion in net worth. Id. at 763.
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AT&T to earn greater profits in the future when it regains
monopoly status.
2. Prices Above Average Variable Cost May Deter Potential
Competition-Furthermore, a regulatory test based on the
average variable cost standard could deter potential providers
of telecommunications services from entering the market.
Potential entrants face exorbitant network construction costs
similar to those encountered by MCI and Sprint. Facing such
a formidable barrier to entry and the concomitant risk of being
unable to recover those tremendous costs, a potential entrant
may decide not to enter the market after assessing the pos-
sibility of AT&T pricing at a level just above average variable
cost. The recently issued U.S. Department of Justice merger
guidelines echo precisely such concerns when they state that
"[flirms considering entry [into an industry] that requires
significant sunk costs must evaluate the profitability of the
entry on the basis of long-term participation in the market,
because the underlying assets will be committed to the market
until they are economically depreciated."" Allowing AT&T to
threaten a potential competitor with the possibility of pricing
slightly above average variable cost may create risk to potential
competitors sufficient to deter entry. Furthermore, if AT&T
should develop "a reputation ... for [a] willingness to use
predatory pricing," AT&T may be able "to exclude other poten-
tial competitors without any additional below-cost selling," as
potential competitors perceive the risk of entry as being
prohibitively high.68
B. The FCC's Rationales for an Average Variable
Cost Test are Uncompelling
The FCC defends the average variable cost standard on
several grounds. First, the FCC argues that antitrust law
provides remedies for antitrust violations by AT&T.69 Such
reasoning fails to recognize that the dominance and influence
67. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDE-
LINES 26 (1992).
68. POSNER, supra note 17, at 186.
69. Second Further Notice, supra note 43, at 3115. The FCC stresses that,
despite the existence of the price cap regulatory scheme, injured plaintiffs may still
pursue an antitrust claim. Id.
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of AT&T in the telephone market has been an enduring con-
cern of FCC regulation for decades.7" Furthermore, the history
of antitrust litigation in this country demonstrates that a
deep-pocketed defendant with a team of artful lawyers can
stall antitrust litigation long enough to allow only Pyrrhic
victories.71 Thus, antitrust plaintiffs challenging AT&T pre-
dation may find their recoveries deferred for a long period of
time. Further, remedies occurring after the fact can provide
only imperfect compensation to a company that has lost both
its market share and its ability to compete.72 This conclusion
holds especially true in the telecommunications industry,
which is driven by technological advances.73
Second, the FCC points to the general acceptance of the
average variable cost standard in other settings as part of its
rationale for adopting the standard in the telecommunications
context. The FCC cites as evidence several federal antitrust
cases to demonstrate the allegedly widespread use of an
average variable cost standard as the test for predation.74
Interestingly, only one of the cases cited involves the telecom-
munications industry.75 The force of such an analogy to other
industries wanes quickly when one considers the unique
nature of the telecommunications industry. In most
industries, variable costs greatly exceed fixed costs. An
examination of the financial statements of leading firms in
such diverse fields as energy production, automobile
manufacturing, and surface transportation indicates that
variable costs can exceed fixed costs by anywhere from 39% to
70. DONALD E. LIVELY, ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW 203
(1992).
71. Take, for example, the celebrated antitrust litigation against Standard Oil.
State and Federal efforts to use antitrust law to control the Standard Oil combination
spanned a period of over two decades at the turn of the century. Some regard these
efforts as unsuccessful despite their length and the amount of resources expended.
See BRUCE BRINGHURST, ANTITRUST AND THE OIL MONOPOLY: THE STANDARD OIL
CASES, 1890-1911 (1979). Other examples of lengthy antitrust litigation involving
America's leading companies, including AT&T, abound. See generally TALBOT S.
LINDSTROM & KEVIN P. TIGHE, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES (1974).
72. In fact, AT&T's competitors made precisely this argument in the regulatory
process preceding the issuance of the most recent price cap order. See Reconsidera-
tion Order, supra note 21, at 682 n.35.
73. For a discussion of the interaction between technology and competition in the
telecommunications industry, see MANLEY R. IRWIN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA
72-76 (1984).
74. See supra note 51.
75. See Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
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373%. v Such figures suggest that an average variable cost
standard indeed might be appropriate in these industries.
Companies in these industries must focus primarily on
recouping the variable costs in order to remain solvent, as
variable costs are much greater than fixed costs. Thus, a test
for predation in these industries can ignore fixed costs more
easily because of their secondary importance.
In the telecommunications industry, however, the primacy
of fixed costs reverses this situation. For example, MCI's
variable costs are only eighty-one percent of their fixed costs.
7 v
Sprint's variable costs are even lower, constituting a mere
fifty-seven percent of fixed costs. 78  In contrast to firms in
other industries, telecommunications firms face a great risk
when entering the market and must recoup fixed costs to
survive. Yet the FCC ignores this fact by allowing AT&T to
price at a level that covers only variable costs and that would
deny its competitors the opportunity to recoup their fixed
costs. Despite the widespread acceptance of the average
variable cost test in other contexts, such pricing still could be
predatory in the telecommunications industry.
Third, the FCC relies on the protections that it views as
inherent in the system of baskets and bands to deter renewed
anticompetitive behavior by AT&T.7 9 These devices, however,
provide only imperfect protection against AT&T predation.
Because AT&T enjoys resources vastly superior to those of any
competitor,8 0 it would not need to cross-subsidize in order to
predatorily lower prices for one service. Instead, AT&T could
decide strategically to maintain losses for that service,
knowing that its greater resource base would allow it to
76. Variable costs are reflected in a firm's financial statements under the
category of operating expenses. Relevant 1991 figures for operating costs and fixed
costs in property and equipment are as follow: H. Phillips Petroleum Co., $11.6
million operating costs, $8.3 million fixed costs, PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO., 1991
ANNUAL REPORT 40-41 (1992); Consolidated Freightways, Inc., $3.3 billion operating
costs, $1.8 billion fixed costs, CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, INC., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT
24-26 (1992); General Motors Corp., $129 billion operating costs (including depreci-
ation), $68 billion fixed costs, GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 23-24
(1992); Chrysler Corp., $29 billion operating costs, $10.5 billion fixed costs, CHRYSLER
CORP., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 24-26 (1992).
77. MCI lists almost $9 billion in fixed costs in property and equipment and only
$7 billion in operating costs in its financial statements. MCI COMMUNICATIONS CORP.,
supra note 60, at 30-31.
78. Similarly, Sprint lists $13 billion in fixed costs and only $8 billion in operat-
ing costs. SPRINT CORP., supra note 62, at 27-28.
79. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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undercut the prices of its competitors until they are driven out
of business. Then, having re-established its monopoly
position, AT&T could charge supercompetitive rates to earn
long-term profits. Potential entrants, aware of AT&T's dem-
onstrated ability to engage in destructive competition, would
be deterred from entering the lucrative market by the threat
of renewed price cuts.
Finally, the five percent cap on annual rate reductions
provides little protection against predation given the highly
competitive nature of the telecommunications market.81 AT&T
presently must compete vigorously for market share with MCI,
Sprint, and other telecommunications carriers. For example,
AT&T, MCI, and Sprint spent a combined $150 million in
advertising during the first quarter of 1992 alone.82 In such
a competitive market, a relatively small price decrease could
drive other market players out of the industry. Yet under the
current price cap scheme, AT&T could lower its prices by a full
ten percent in slightly more than one year and face no
administrative obstacles except for the average variable cost
test used under streamlined review. 3 Because the highly
competitive nature of the telecommunications industry, a price
reduction of ten percent may prove sufficient to destroy
AT&T's competition. Such a price cut also could limit its
competitors' expenditures on research and development,
thereby crippling their ability to compete in the technol-
ogy-intensive industry.8 4 In any case, the five percent limit on
81. See IRWIN, supra note 73, at 69-72. Irwin describes this competition as
intensive and frantic. Id. at 72. The intense nature of competition in the telecom-
munications industry perhaps can be explained by the essentially fungible nature of
telephone and other telecommunications services. If consumers do not perceive any
difference between telephone services, they are not likely to be loyal to a specific
company. Instead, consumers generally will switch to the carrier offering the most
cost-effective service. This is reflected in the high elasticity of demand in the
telephone service market. See Comments of AT&T at 12, In re Price Cap Perfor-
mance Review for AT&T, No. 92-134 (F.C.C. filed Sept. 4, 1992) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Comments of AT&T].
82. Comments of AT&T, supra note 81, at 13. In fact, the telecommunications
market may be one of the most competitive in America. By 1992, there were 482 long
distance carriers providing service in the United States, representing a 13% increase
since 1989. The number of customers switching from or to AT&T has increased by
60% since 1989. Id. at 10-13.
83. For a discussion of streamlined review under the FCC's price cap scheme, see
supra notes 27-28, 36-38 and accompanying text.
84. Telecommunications companies must remain on the cutting edge of technologi-
cal developments in order to be successful in the competitive telecommunications
market. If a telecommunications company falls behind in the technological race, it will
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annual reductions places only a minimal restraint on AT&T's
ability to predate and engage in destructive competition.
III. Two TESTS INCLUDING FIXED COSTS WOULD GUARD
BETTER AGAINST PREDATION
As the previous discussion has demonstrated, an effective
test for telecommunications predation must consider fixed
costs. By adopting the average variable cost test prevalent in
other industries, however, the FCC adopted a test which
ignores fixed costs. Fortunately, the average variable cost test
is not the only available standard against which to measure a
company's allegedly predatory pricing. In fact, a popular
handbook on industrial organization identifies seven separate
tests for predatory pricing.8 5 Two of these tests, one offered by
Judge Richard Posner and the other by Professors Paul
Joskow and Alvin Klevorick, include an examination of long-
run costs in determining predation. Either of these tests
would alleviate the grave problem inherent in present FCC
practice. The following discussion reviews and compares these
two tests for predatory pricing and suggests that the FCC
could improve its present regulatory scheme by replacing the
average variable cost test with the test prescribed by
Professors Joskow and Klevorick.
A. The Posner Test
Judge Richard Posner presents a two-pronged test to identify
predatory pricing. 6  Posner recognizes that predation is a
strategic phenomena that provides benefits to a firm only in the
long run. 7 For this reason, the first prong of the Posner test
evaluates a challenged price or tariff by determining whether
lose market share to more innovative rivals. See IRWIN, supra note 73, at 72-76.
85. Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537, 579-90 (Richard Schmallense &
Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
86. POSNER, supra note 17, at 189; see also Ordover & Saloner, supra note 85, at
584.
87. POSNER, supra note 17, at 188-89. Successful predation is necessarily long
run because it requires a period of below-cost pricing followed by a period of monopoly
pricing. Id.
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it exceeds the long-run cost of providing the service.88 The
long-run cost standard, which by definition includes fixed
costs, would alleviate a defect of current FCC practice.
The second prong of the Posner test examines the competi-
tor's intent in pricing the service. 9 Posner would find prices
below long-run marginal cost presumptively predatory if
accompanied by an intent to exclude an equally or more
efficient competitor.90 This requirement of the Posner test is
weak because Posner fails to explain how to determine
whether the potential predator has the requisite intent.91
Thus, the Posner test would prove particularly difficult to
implement because it would be difficult to determine AT&T's
intent in establishing a pricing schedule and Posner's pre-
scription fails to provide a methodology.
For example, a competitor of AT&T could charge that a new
AT&T tariff constitutes predatory pricing. This competitor
could present financial analyses demonstrating that AT&T's
prices do not exceed long-run marginal cost, thus satisfying
the first prong of the Posner inquiry. Demonstrating AT&T's
predatory intent, however, would prove to be a thornier
problem. Of course, predatory intent could be shown upon an
express admission by a responsible AT&T officer that the price
was intended to be an instrument of predation. Because
predatory pricing is illegal under federal law, 92 however,
AT&T's officers are unlikely ever to admit that one of their
tariff schedules was intended to be predatory. Further, there
are difficult questions regarding whose intent matters for a
determination of predatory intent. It is unclear whether
Posner would require predatory intent of one, a majority, or all
of the officers of the company in order to condemn the rate. In
addition, Posner fails to state whether an express intent must
be required under his test for predation, or whether a con-
structive or implied intent would suffice.
Posner himself admits that the "availability of evidence of
improper intent is often a function of luck and of the defen-
dant's legal sophistication, not of the underlying reality. A
firm with executives sensitized to antitrust problems will not
88. Id.
89. Id. at 189.
90. Id.
91. Ordover & Saloner, supra note 85, at 584.
92. See, e.g., Moore v. Meade's Fine Bread Co., 348 US. 115, 119-20 (1954).
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leave any documentary trail of improper intent."93 Thus, it is
uncertain whether adopting the Posner test would constitute
an improvement over the currently used average variable cost
test. It is true that the Posner test would consider whether
AT&T's prices recoup fixed costs, thereby eliminating the
major shortcoming of present FCC practice. The difficulties of
the second prong of the Posner test regarding predatory
intent, however, could render the test as ineffective as the
average variable cost test in guarding against predation.
B. The Joskow-Klevorick Test
The Joskow-Klevorick (J-K) test similarly establishes a
two-tiered approach to identify predation.94 The first tier
examines the structural preconditions for successful and
rational predation.9" "These structural preconditions include
(a) the dominant firm's market share; (b) the size of other
firms in the market; (c) the stability of market shares over
time; (d) the dominant firm's profit history; (e) residual elas-
ticities of demand; and (f) the conditions" bearing on ease of
entry into the market.96 The first tier operates "to filter out
allegations of predatory conduct which are likely to prove
baseless."97
Under the J-K test, an industry does not have to exhibit all
of the preconditions for successful predation in order to pass
to the second tier analysis.98 Instead, the first tier analysis is
used to obtain an overall picture of the market in question to
determine whether, on balance, the structure of the market
makes it likely that a dominant firm could engage in
predatory pricing.99 J-K's structural analysis suggests that the
current telecommunications market is amenable to predation.
First, AT&T controls the lion's share of the market; AT&T's
closest competitor for long distance services controls merely
93. POSNER, supra note 17, at 189-90.
94. Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 17, at 242.
95. Id. at 244.
96. Ordover & Saloner, supra note 85, at 583; see also Joskow & Klevorick, supra
note 17, at 224-34.
97. Ordover & Saloner, supra note 85, at 583.
98. Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 17, at 245.
99. Id. at 246.
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sixteen percent of the market.100 Second, because competition
in the telecommunications market is a relatively new phe-
nomena, 10 1 market shares have been relatively unstable.
AT&T's long distance market share has declined steadily since
the 1982 consent decree that divested AT&T of its local
operating companies. 10 2 Nonetheless, AT&T's renewed ability
to engage in predatory pricing resulting from the freedom and
flexibility of the price cap scheme makes it difficult to predict
the future market shares of telecommunications carriers. In
fact, one could conclude from the potential of AT&T to price
predatorily that the market shares of AT&T's competitors are
inherently unstable. Third, AT&T has a long history of strong
profitability, although this history stems largely from its past
role as a government-sanctioned monopoly. 0 3 Finally, the
barriers to market entry associated with the tremendous
network construction costs make it very difficult for potential
competitors to enter the field. 0 4 These factors suggest that
the structural preconditions for successful predation in the
telecommunications industry have been met.
If industry conditions meet the first tier of the J-K approach,
the pricing policies of companies in that industry then would
be evaluated under the second tier.'0 5 Under the second tier,
pricing below average total cost0 6 will be presumptively
100. See supra notes 60, 66, and accompanying text.
101. In 1982, federal judge Harold Greene affirmed a consent decree ending
decades long antitrust litigation between the Department of Justice and AT&T. See
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). This consent decree resulted in a massive
restructuring of AT&T, and required complete divestiture by AT&T of its telecom-
munications holdings in the private intercity telephone service markets. Id. at 141.
In the post-consent decree telecommunications world, competition rather than regu-
lated monopoly was to drive the new structure. Richard A Hindman, The Diversity
Principle and the MFJ Information Services Restrictions: Applying Time-Worn First
Amendment Assumptions to New Technologies, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 471, 497 (1989).
102. Comments of AT&T, supra note 81, at 13. For example, AT&T's overall
share of minutes of use of residential domestic service declined from 83% to 64% in
the first quarter of 1992. Id.
103. For a review of AT&T's successful history, see SONNY KLEINFIELD, THE
BIGGEST COMPANY ON EARTH (1981).
104. See supra Part II.A.2.
105. For a full description of their second tier tests, see Joskow & IKevorick, supra
note 17, at 249-58.
106. Id. at 253. Average total cost is calculated by dividing the sum of the fixed
and variable costs by the number of units produced or supplied. AREEDA & TURNER,
supra note 18. In essence, average total cost measures the total incremental cost of
producing an average unit. Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 17, at 252 n.79.
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illegal. °7 The party seeking to establish the legality of its
filed tariff would need to provide cost studies and economic
analyses to show that the challenged pricing exceeds average
total cost. 08
This second tier test is preferable to the second prong of
Posner's test because it provides a clear methodology with
which to establish presumptively illegal pricing. Furthermore,
this second tier test alleviates the problems inherent in the
current regulatory scheme, as discussed previously. Thus, the
average total cost test as applied by Joskow and Klevorick
should be incorporated into the price cap regulations by sub-
stituting for the current variable cost test as follows:
Each price cap filing by a dominant carrier in the tele-
phone industry that proposes service category rates below
applicable bond limits established in Section 61.47(e) of
this part, must be accompanied by supporting materials
establishing that the rates cover the service category's
average total costs. 0 9
This test would condemn pricing below average variable cost
as well as pricing levels that would prevent AT&T's com-
petitors from recouping their fixed costs. In addition to
providing improved protection against AT&T predation, using
an average total cost test comports with the sound economic
theory that equilibrium prices in competitive markets will
equal average total cost." °
CONCLUSION
During a recent session of the United States Congress, the
House Committee on the Judiciary indicated its interest in
107. Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 17, at 253. The J-K test would allow the
dominant firm to assert an affirmative defense if it shows that pricing below average
total cost maximizes profits in the short run. This defense is likely to succeed only
"when substantial excess production capacity exists in the industry." Id.
108. Id. at 261. If a plaintiff shows under the first tier of the test that predatory
preconditions exist, the defendant then carries the burden of production with respect
to the second tier. Id.
109. This amendment would be to 47 C.F.R. 61.49(d). Compare this with the
existing regulation, supra note 49.
110. Ordover & Saloner, supra note 85, at 583.
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examining the need to clarify the legal standard for deter-
mining predatory pricing activities.' The language of the
report suggests that the Committee will search for a single
standard against which to measure the predatory nature of a
company's pricing policies. This Note demonstrates that a
single test for predatory pricing may not be equally effective
across different industries. Although the average variable cost
test has received general acceptance as a test for predatory
pricing, such a test does not provide effective protection in the
telecommunications context because of the capital-intensive
nature of that industry. As a replacement for the average
variable cost test, this Note suggests that the FCC adopt the
two-tiered approach offered by Professors Joskow and
Klevorick as a better method by which to determine whether
a new tariff filing by AT&T constitutes predatory pricing.
Perhaps the FCC's concern for predation is less than genu-
ine, despite. the language of its own orders and opinions. In
fact, some of the arguably cryptic language in the AT&T price
cap orders suggests precisely such a conclusion." 2 If this is
the case, then the FCC should relieve AT&T of the senseless
regulatory burden of demonstrating that below-band filings
cover average variable cost. On the other hand, if the FCC's
concern for predation proves genuine, the FCC should put
some real teeth into the test for predation.
111. COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., PROVIDING AMOUNTS FROM THE CONTINGENT FUND
OF THE HOUSE FOR THE EXPENSES OF INVESTIGATION AND STUDIES BY STANDING AND
SELECT COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE, H.R. REP. No. 419, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 316
(1990). The courts also have recognized that predatory pricing is not a well-defined
offense. See, e.g., Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855-56 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 795-96 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
112. See, for example, Second Further Notice, supra note 43, at 3114, which states
that the FCC has, "through the structure of AT&T's service baskets, created condi-
tions under which predation should be as unlikely in the interexchange telecom-
munications market as it is in the economy generally." This may be doublespeak, as
an administration dominated by Republican appointees intent on deregulation and
perhaps steeped in Chicago School economic analysis of the law may actually believe
that predatory pricing never exists. See Paul S. Dempsey, The Interstate Commis-
sion-Disintegration of an American Legal Institution, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1984)
(commenting on the deregulation agenda of Reagan's appointees); Teresa Moran
Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1345
(1993) (commenting on the Reagan Administration's deregulation policy); see also
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1986) (using
an economic rationality theory to conclude that predatory pricing is unlikely). It
currently is unclear what impact the change of administration which accompanied
the 1992 election will have on telecommunications policy as the Clinton FCC Chair-
man and much of the staff have yet to be appointed.
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